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Abstract
Physical retailers, who once led the way in tracking with loy-
alty cards and ‘reverse appends’, now lag behind online com-
petitors. Yet we might be seeing these tables turn, as many
increasingly deploy technologies ranging from simple sensors
to advanced emotion detection systems, even enabling them to
tailor prices and shopping experiences on a per-customer basis.
Here, we examine these in-store tracking technologies in the
retail context, and evaluate them from both technical and reg-
ulatory standpoints. We first introduce the relevant technolo-
gies in context, before considering privacy impacts, the current
remedies individuals might seek through technology and the
law, and those remedies’ limitations. To illustrate challenging
tensions in this space we consider the feasibility of technical
and legal approaches to both a) the recent ‘Go’ store concept
from Amazon which requires fine-grained, multi-modal track-
ing to function as a shop; and b) current challenges in opting
in or out of increasingly pervasive passive Wi-Fi tracking. The
‘Go’ store presents significant challenges with its legality in
Europe significantly unclear and unilateral, technical measures
to avoid biometric tracking likely ineffective. In the case of
MAC addresses, we see a difficult-to-reconcile clash between
privacy-as-confidentiality and privacy-as-control, and suggest
a technical framework which might help balance the two. Sig-
nificant challenges exist when seeking to balance personalisa-
tion with privacy, and researchers must work together, includ-
ing across the boundaries of preferred privacy definitions, to
come up with solutions that draw on both technology and the
legal frameworks to provide effective and proportionate pro-
tection. Retailers, simultaneously, must ensure that their track-
ing is not just legal, but worthy of the trust of concerned data
subjects.
1 Introduction
The market share of online retailers across many sectors has
been steadily growing at the expense of retailers with physical
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stores. This is partially due to the ease of purchases, but also
because of the heavy tailoring and personalisation enabled by
digital tracking technologies. However, physical stores are no
newbies to customer tracking either. For example, approxi-
mately two decades ago, data from Tesco’s Clubcard scheme
in the UK formed the basis for 80,000 variants of a single shot
of direct marketing material [18]. In other instances, retailers
have even sought to link credit card details back to the cus-
tomers’ addresses by employing “reverse append” practices,
bringing a slew of specific legal and legislative responses [6].
Today, the proliferation of cheap sensors and ubiquitous smart-
phones enables the deployment of more advanced behavioural
inference systems, some of which aim to drastically alter the
physical shopping experience. However, while some personal-
isation may be desirable—after all, shopping can be a stressful
experience [4]—many shoppers may consider it invasive, or
feel vulnerable to unethical and illegal decision-making, such
as price discrimination based on protected characteristics.
In this paper, we consider the privacy implications of in-store
tracking. We first outline applicable technologies, including
ambient sensors receiving signals from personal devices (e.g.
through WiFi, Bluetooth) or individuals’ biometric traces (e.g.
appearance, gait), as well as tracking through software in-
stalled on individuals’ own devices. Following a broad dis-
cussion of relevant privacy issues in social and legal context,
we then look into mitigation and control practices. In particu-
lar, we examine both purely technical countermeasures deploy-
able unilaterally by the customer, and legal obligations aim-
ing to bind retailers to follow proper data collection and han-
dling practices. Moreover, we highlight times where tracking
and its technical and legal countermeasures clash by consider-
ing a) the next generation of in-store tracking, typified by the
Amazon ‘Go’ proposal, where tracking is required for shop-
ping functionality and b) the technical and legal status of Wi-Fi
tracking mitigation. Though these two examples, we identify
emerging challenges in both technical and legal governance,
and propose promising directions. We conclude by noting that
to ensure personalisation remains privacy-preserving and pro-
portionate, researchers must work together to mix different no-
tions of privacy, particularly around biometric tracking, and
ensure support for them in legal and technical frameworks,
whilst retailers must ensure that any tracking is not just legal,
but worthy of the trust of concerned data subjects.
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2 Ends & Means of in-store Tracking
The difficulty of tracking in physical spaces caused physical
retailers to lag far behind their online counterparts. Yet new
tracking products utilising cheap sensors, novel analytics and
ubiquitous personal devices have overcome many of these hur-
dles, meaning potential collection of granular customer behav-
ior data can now be talked about in comparable terms to some-
one browsing a website. At a basic level, these data can inform
operational decisions—stores noticing that people often walk
from the “snacks” aisle to the “alcohol” one, and rearrange
the locations of these goods accordingly. While this sounds
like useful analytics, in many cases it might be just using an
invasive sledgehammer to crack a nut—similar insights may
be possible to reach with a range of methods and approaches.
More advanced techniques however leave retailers with fine-
grained inferences that can be used to take fine-grained ac-
tion, such as extending personalised offers based on nuanced
views of individuals’ consumption profiles. Overall, the data
collected by in-store tracking systems is applicable to several
areas including
v Demand Management: Anticipating general footfall and
specific demand for products and services to optimise em-
ployee scheduling and stock logistics.
v Business Development: Understanding customer be-
haviour and habits, so as to make more appealing product
offerings or more effective store layouts.
v Marketing & Sales Optimisation: Using profiling tools
for direct marketing or price discrimination.
2.1 Tracking Technologies
In-store tracking tools gather the quantities and modalities of
required data through careful monitoring (i.e. sensing) of cus-
tomers’ behaviour. Sensing in the retail context can be per-
formed in either an active or a passive manner. Active tech-
nologies comprise of a network of probes deployed in the retail
premises and a sensor carried by the customer. On the other
hand, passive technologies rely on sensors that are deployed
in the ambient environment and monitor either the customers
themselves (e.g. biometric sensors such as facial or gait recog-
nition) or the digital traces left by their personal devices (e.g.
Wi-Fi probe-loggers).
2.1.1 Active Signalling
This class of customer tracking techniques relies primarily on
the users’ own devices. Modern handheld devices (e.g. smart-
phones, watches) come with a variety of sensors and connec-
tivity capabilities useful for such tasks (e.g. Bluetooth or GPS
chips). One approach to utilise these sensors is for retailers
to develop software (e.g. ‘apps’) and incentivise their installa-
tion through discounts or functionality such as information re-
trieval. Upon installation, the application generally associates
itself with one or more environmental triggers. Such a trigger
may be the user launching the app, the GPS reporting the co-
ordinates of a brand’s branch, or an inaudible signal emitted
by the retailer’s speakers. Those triggers are then associated
with certain actions such as the collection and sharing of real-
time data (e.g. location, trigger identifier) with the tracking
provider.
Radio Beacons. These are small devices that emit short-
range wireless signals that are then picked up by nearby de-
vices running the retailer’s app. In basic deployments, beacons
simply echo a unique identifier associated with the in-store
area they cover, whilst in more advanced ones they also push
real-time information to users’ devices. In both cases, the sig-
nals emitted by the beacons serve as a trigger for the retailer’s
app, which then forwards the observed identifiers (along with
a timestamp) to the tracking provider’s servers. Using this in-
formation, the tracking provider can analyse the behavior of
each individual (e.g. points of interest, trajectories, product
returns), build a profile and even push personalised notifica-
tions to their device. The most widespread beacon products use
Bluetooth/Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)—technologies bene-
fiting from both a range ideal for indoor tracking and minimal
battery usage on a customer’s device. Two notably beacons are
Google’s Eddystone [21] and Apple’s iBeacon [2], although
non-trivial investment is needed to install enough to ensure full
space coverage.
Audiovisual Beacons. In other cases, retailers employ ultra-
sound based beacons utilising existing speakers to emit high
frequency signals inaudible to humans, but which encode a
unique identifier [30]. These can even be embedded in other
audible content, like songs. Standard smartphone microphones
can capture those high-frequency signals and trigger retail-
ers’ apps to report the collected data to the tracking provider.
Where multiple devices are being used, such technologies can
link the different devices of the user, together in a tracker’s
database [30, 38]. A similar technique in the visual domain
is light pattern signaling, where flickering LED lighting un-
noticeable by humans can contain unique identifiers able to
be captured and decoded by smartphone cameras and soft-
ware [33]. These technologies are not only useful in real-time,
but can also apply to data shared by the user later online, such
as a video message or post.
Geomagnetic Positioning. A less widespread technique, ge-
omagnetic positioning uses the Earth’s geomagnetic fields and
the smartphone’s compass to precisely locate individuals in in-
door spaces (i.e., 1-2 meters accuracy [23]). Each building has
a unique magnetic “distortion fingerprint” occurring from way
building materials affect and “distort” the otherwise persistent
magnetic field generated by the Earth. Those distortion pat-
terns can be mapped to the building’s floor plan and track user
movements. It should be noted that the compass sensor in An-
droid devices currently requires no access permission, meaning
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that even where the user has not consented to this tracking on
a device level, it could be occurring [20].
2.1.2 Passive Signalling
In contrast to active techniques, passive ones do not require any
user participation, relying entirely on sensors in the ambient
environment designed to pick up biometric signals (e.g. face or
gait) or digital traces from devices (e.g. Wi-Fi probe packets).
Wifi Logging. A popular technique, this involves intercept-
ing, capturing and processing the packets transmitted by Wi-
Fi–enabled devices when they are searching for networks to
connect to. These packets are broadcast out by smartphones
(and all Wi-Fi–enabled devices) to query nearby access points
for their name (i.e. SSID) and other characteristics (e.g. en-
cryption ciphers used). They carry the media access control
(MAC) address of the device which uniquely identifies it. By
monitoring these MAC addresses and the signal strength (i.e.
RSSI) retailers can monitor the location of a device and track
the customer’s behaviour over time. In some cases, triangula-
tion techniques may be used to pinpoint the exact location of
the customer. It should be noted that Wi-Fi monitoring does
not require any user actions, provided that the customer’s de-
vice has the Wi-Fi functionality ‘enabled’.
At first glance, it may appear as if it is hard to link a MAC
address to the customer’s name. However, retailers employ
multiple tracking techniques that may enable them to per-
form such a pairing. For instance, a MAC address that was
tracked to be at a checkout point at a particular time can be
easily linked to a customer through the loyalty card used dur-
ing checkout. For this reason, many mobile operating systems
(e.g., Android, iOS) started using “MAC randomization” [29],
where the MAC address reported by the device when prob-
ing for networks, is constantly changing in a non-predictable
manner. While this technique protects the users from being se-
cretly tracked, it provides no way for them to consent to being
tracked by specific vendors—for example, if they are deliver-
ing personalisation desired by the user. Later, in Section 5.2,
we introduce a new randomisation technique that allows users
to opt-in to being tracked by selected vendors whilst they main-
tain anonymity towards all others.
Imaging Technologies. These are a class of techniques util-
ising a network of high-resolution cameras to capture and anal-
yse physical characteristics of shoppers, now more accessible
to retailers after a significant drop in equipment prices and a
number of breakthroughs in machine vision. A simple use of
imaging technologies is for statistical counting, such as mea-
suring footfall in different parts of a store, comparable to en-
trance turnstiles or laser beams with some additional analytical
possibilities. Yet other systems go beyond locating individuals
to infer characteristics about them. These range from the rela-
tively straight-forward inference of gender or age to more ad-
vanced analysis based on affective computing, such as mood,
Fig. 1: Heatmap generated by Walkbase tracking product,
showing customer movement in a retail store.
emotion or attention. Further forms of analysis are designed
for biometric identification of individuals, from facial recogni-
tion to recognition on the basis of other features, such as body
shape or gait [26, 35]. In the case of mood estimation, some
emerging technologies claim to track micro-expressions (i.e.
very brief, involuntary facial expressions) to better infer the
visitor’s emotions for the products they encounter while shop-
ping [7]. Particularly relevant here is eye tracking, a technique
to follow a customer’s gaze to uncover their aisle browsing
habits, what attracts their attention, which visual elements they
notice or ignore, and how they interact with products on the
shelf (e.g. pick up, return). Until recently eye tracking required
that the participants wear special tracking glasses, and hence it
was used only in pilot studies. However, Cloverleaf [10] and
Affectiva [1] recently introduced shelves that feature micro-
cameras capable of tracking eye movement thus enabling re-
tailers to use the technology in real-life deployments.
3 Privacy & in-store Tracking
When considering privacy in retail contexts, we accept that it
is an important but contested concept, characterised by “ca-
cophony, category error, and people talking past each other” at
a range of conceptual and empirical levels [31]. Consequently,
we do not start from one particular notion of it, but from poten-
tially socially contentious data analysis and use in the context
of individuals’ digital traces in retail outlets and similar physi-
cal spaces.
Given this, what private information might be at stake in re-
tail spaces? Assume, without considering the technologies
closely at this moment, that your actions and identities as a
customer were visible to a retailer. They might include your
shopping routine (which may explain something about your
job and lifestyle); the volume of your purchases (likely to
disclose something about your household); your physical at-
tributes such as appearance or gait (which may betray anything
from health data to characteristics such as gender or ethnic-
ity), clothing (which may betray tastes or demographic data);
changes in purchase preferences (from which pregnancy or fi-
nancial turmoil may be inferred); individuals you are com-
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monly seen with, or stop and talk to—and so on. This data
impacts upon not just individuals and those close to them, but
may also allow further inferences to be made around groups
these individuals are part of, such as those sharing a partic-
ular health characteristic [37]. While many of these factors
may seem at first glance to require detailed study to discern,
selected elements of human behaviour are surprisingly pre-
dictable, quickly leading to ‘creepy’–sounding results..
In-store tracking is significantly and increasingly concerning
to a large proportion of consumers. According to a 2014 sur-
vey of 1,042 US consumers conducted by American consumer
feedback company OpinionLab, 80% of respondents find in-
store tracking using mobile phones unacceptable, and 81% said
they don’t trust retailers to keep data private and secure [32].
A study for the European Commission in 2015 reports that
tracking concerns in retail contexts are growing in the UK,
with 45% (of 1,328) of UK residents concerned about track-
ing via loyalty cards (the third most concerned nation in Eu-
rope, up from 36% in 2005) and 51% concerned about being
recorded in private, commercial spaces (the most concerned
nation in Europe, up from 40% in 2005) [16]. In both these
studies, generational differences are not notable: what some
have characterised as a lesser emphasis on privacy and data
held by younger generations online does not seem to translate
into physical contexts.
As will be discussed however, truly avoiding tracking is a dif-
ficult task for an individual, if possible at all. In order to
manage the issues that arise from the collection and process-
ing of data, we consider two main modes of governance [12].
The first, privacy-as-confidentiality, seeks to use technological
means to ensure minimal information lost or leaked from the
individuals carrying out desired tasks. This is characterised by
the field of ‘privacy-enhancing technologies’ (PETs), whose
researchers utilise primarily cryptographic methods for tasks
such as foiling tracking methods or to ‘have your cake and eat
it’—do analysis on whole datasets while learning a minimal
amount about individuals within them. The trust only your-
self mindset of privacy-as-confidentiality is that the world is
full of adversaries who are not deserving of trust. PETs re-
searchers assume we need technologies which work even in
largely untrusted environments. The second can be described
as privacy-as-control: the viewpoint from which data protec-
tion law operates. Privacy-as-control seeks to build a trust the
trackers mindset by seeing them as data controllers with obli-
gations mandated by regulations, including obligations to hon-
our the rights of data subjects whose personal data are being
processed by affording them abilities such as to access, erase
or port their data, or to object to processing or certain data-
driven decision-making. Through this process, it attempts to
build social trust in organisations that might otherwise be ad-
versaries, and to shape them into responsible stewards, rather
than ruthless exploiters, of data.
Despite the potential for sensitive inferences, we do not deny
that some insights could be useful for the purposes of service
delivery. Indeed, personalisation is a powerful tool for priori-
tisation in the information age, and many individuals who dis-
like shopping with a passion may well find themselves greatly
aided by systems that guide their hands and their wallets in
physical environments. Personalisation per se is not the villain,
even though well-known public concerns do exist surrounding
extreme personalisation, particularly around the exploitation
of data perceived as unjust (e.g. to manipulate customers or
to pass to national security) or the inadvertent construction of
echo chambers lacking serendipitous exposure to new factors.
Indeed, a great deal of work in areas such as web science and
human–computer interaction has surrounded how to make bet-
ter interfaces that adapt more readily to individuals’ needs [8].
In this paper, we argue that it will be necessary to explore how
tracking practices in retail spaces might be governed without
relying solely on either trust-based control or technologically-
assured confidentiality.
4 Controlling tracking
4.1 Trusting only yourself: Unilateral Mitigation
The first perspective on how tracking can be controlled
emerges from the privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) liter-
ature. This attempts to devise technical approaches to mitigate
privacy breaches even where the world contains a high propor-
tion of untrusted adversaries. Ideally, such approaches should
not restrict a user’s ability to make use of a service beneficial
to her. Where sensors observe biometric data in public spaces,
retaining control is costly. While researchers have developed
clothing to ‘fool’ recognition sensors [34], this places a high
burden on an individual simply trying to exercise what in Eu-
rope is a fundamental right. Not only are these systems also
trying to fool a moving target, the signals given away by in-
dividuals attempting to obscure themselves may themselves be
used to profile those individuals en masse—for example, to de-
liver higher prices. Where systems track using data from your
own sensors, individuals must ensure that no tracking code is
being executed on their device. This can be difficult for a num-
ber of reasons: individuals can be incentivised to use partic-
ular products or services that transmit or enable transmission
of data due to market availability, fashion, or perks. Loyalty
cards, and more recently, apps, are an example here. The pri-
marily mobile software providers today, Apple and Google,
both have interests in physical tracking infrastructure, and in-
dividuals have few alternative operating system providers ac-
cessible to them on the basis of price, convenience and exper-
tise.
Systems that track using your own sensors, rather than your
own signals, such as ultrasound beacons, can be avoided if an
individual ensures no tracking code is being executed on your
device (or attack being undertaken). This might initially seem
like a comparatively simple task indeed, having tracking code
running on your device seems as much a problem of security
as of privacy but it becomes less so when it is considered that
these sensors might be enabled by the same apps that users are
incentivised to download (and to enable hardware permissions
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for) due to in-store convenience or savings. When privacy tan-
gibly costs time, money and effort, how possible is meaningful
consent?
4.2 Trusting the trackers: Legal obligations
It could be argued that a shopping mall is hardly a space where
one has a “reasonable expectation” of privacy—a legal test
present although operationalised differently in both US (Fourth
Amendment) and EU (art 8, ECHR) jurisprudence. Indeed,
well-known figures wearing oversized sunglasses in public is
presumably because these individuals reasonably expect to be
looked at and potentially recognised. Yet just as many vir-
tual spaces controlled by private entities have gained a pseudo-
public character, nowadays it is more and more possible to
capture or infer private information from individuals in public
spaces. Much of this personal data (e.g. that broadcast from
devices, resulting from conscious interaction with technolo-
gies, or biometrically observed) might once have only been
stored at home or in a medical record, if at all [15].
While privacy law rooted in fundamental rights (e.g. ECHR
art 8 and the US Fourth Amendment) has moved on slightly
from considering privacy in public as a total contradiction and
imagining that seclusion is suitable choice or alternative, it still
remains difficult to convince a court on these grounds [15].
Data protection (DP) law on the other hand1, does not distin-
guish between public and private space, but focuses instead on
the difference between personal and non-personal data in de-
termining its applicability. Additionally, it governs public and
private actors in (relatively) similar ways, making it a highly
unusual regulatory instrument, but consequently a surprisingly
wide-ranging one. This places DP law as the core legal struc-
ture for concerns relating to retailers’ uses of tracking tech-
nologies.
The first relevant thing to note is the broadness of the personal
data (PD) concept in EU DP law, and the consequences of this
for the types of collection activities we have discussed above.
While there is no omnibus data protection law in the US, the
concepts they do have (‘personally identifying information’,
or PII) tend to rely on an explicit identifier. In the EU, the PD
concept is framed around a) any information that relates to b)
any natural person identifiable, even indirectly, by some or all
of that data. As high dimensional data of many types can be
effectively used to ‘fingerprint’ users and single them out in
the future, there is no need for data to be stored alongside an
explicit identifier such as an individual’s name to trigger data
protection rights and obligations over it. IP addresses, even
dynamic ones, are broadly considered PD in Europe according
1In the European Union, this consists primarily of the GDPR (Regulation (EU)
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1.) and the
ePrivacy Directive, which is currently being reformed (Directive 2002/58/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector, OJ 2002 L201/37).
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Breyer,
C-528/14, 2016). The Information Commissioner’s Office (the
ICO), the UK’s Data Protection Authority (DPA), notes that
“using MAC address or other unique identifier to track a de-
vice with the purpose to single them out or treat them differ-
ently (e.g. by offering specific products, services or content)
will involve the processing of personal data” [25]. Some coun-
tries have seen relatively high profile investigations into ambi-
ent tracking, such as the Dutch DPA’s 2015 investigation into
the retail Wi-Fi tracking company, Bluetrace. The same reg-
ulators note that hashing data does not render it non-personal,
although rigorous hashing (e.g. with a salt that changes daily)
is a recommended protection [25].
Just because a user is walking around a store does not mean
that capturing available data about their characteristics, loca-
tion or activities is fair game. Where such data relate to mo-
bile devices on the user’s person, the relevant law in Europe
will depend heavily on the final form of the ePrivacy Regula-
tion which is being redrafted. While the Commission proposal
initially permitted the use of Wi-Fi analytics as long as clear
notices were put up, the version as amended by the European
Parliament (EP) would, unless consent was given, restrict anal-
ysis to ‘mere statistical counting’, limited in time and space
as strictly necessary for the purpose, which would be deleted
or anonymised after the purpose has been fulfilled, with the
users given “effective possibilities to object that do not affect
the functionality of the terminal equipment”.2 The crux being
that except for simple footfall purposes, Wi-Fi tracking with-
out consent will not be allowed—and such consent must not
affect devices functionality, precluding any mechanisms based
on turning off device options such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.
How might such a consent system work? Assume a retailer
seeks to legally use the passive signals sent out by users’ de-
vices in a way that would enable the user to be identified—
for example to provide some personalised information. Under
the legal approach proposed by the EP, the user needs to have
opted in in such a way that they can continue to use their de-
vice as normal were they to decide against the tracking. Es-
sentially, this requires the data controller to hold a whitelist of
device identifiers. As it stands, this is a stronger provision than
current regulatory recommendations. The ICO, for example,
recommends that physical booths or websites exist where indi-
viduals can submit their device to be blacklisted.3 As we note
later in section 5.2, given the current MAC randomisation of
modern smartphones and other devices, maintaining a reliable
white– or blacklist is a much more technically challenging task
than it would initially seem.
Lessons for regulating tensions between consent and track-
ing can be taken from the governance of the web. Amend-
2European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for
private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications
and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, 20 October 2017, art 8.
3The Future of Privacy Forum, an American thinktank, run a service to syn-
dicate blacklists to providers of Wi-Fi tracking. See https://optout.
smart-places.org/.
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ments to the ePrivacy Directive in 2011 led to it being known
publicly as the ‘cookie directive’, in relation to the way in
which is mandated a largely overwhelming and unhelpful con-
firmation of the placement of cookies across the web. Conse-
quently, to overcome this quagmire of exhausting and ineffec-
tive consent-giving, the Article 29 Working Party (also known
as the A29WP, a body of EU DPAs regulators with statutory
responsibility under the Data Protection Directive to advise
on DP matters) has been vocal about both the need to treat
web browser ‘Do Not Track’ (DNT) signals as legally binding
refusals that override implicit consent, and also for the need
for the European Commission to “promote the development of
technical standards for [mobile devices] to automatically sig-
nal an objection against [wifi] tracking” [3]. Yet DNT signals
are less straightforward where biometric signals are involved,
as individuals usually have little choice about the informa-
tion they transmitted from their physical person, and how this
paradigm might move into the physical world is unclear.
Lastly,4 under the GDPR it seems likely that organisations en-
gaging in-store tracking of this sort would be obliged to under-
take a data protection impact assessment (DPIA). The A29WP,
in their draft guidance on this area, suggest that data processing
activities involving both “systematic monitoring of a publicly
accessible area on a large scale” and “evaluation or scoring
[...] especially from [...] locations and movements” will be
considered “likely to result in a high-risk” and require a DPIA.
If a high risk is determined, then the “measures envisaged to
address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and
mechanisms” must be assessed. In the absence of measures
which can mitigate this risk, the data controller must engage
in prior consultation with the data protection authority (in the
UK, the ICO), who can use a wide range of powers, from in-
vestigation to banning processing of this type. While this ‘soft
law’ approach in itself is not binding on outcomes, not only
does it increase the accountabiilty and points for organisational
reflection (for example, reflecting on deployed safeguards), but
firms can be fined up to 2% of global turnover if they fail to un-
dertake a DPIA when it is required.
4.3 Interim comments
Trusting yourself and trusting trackers are two approaches to
governing privacy. Yet in some cases, they are at tension.
Trusting yourself is difficult where institutions have power to
incentivise practices that enable tracking (such as through con-
venience or discounting), where tracking modalities are dif-
ficult to switch off or completely hide (e.g. some wireless
functions, most biometrics), or where possible modes of ob-
fuscation are costly (e.g. swapping loyalty cards). Yet trusting
others is difficult where the relationship is essentially coercive
(e.g. where consent or opt-outs are not effective), where keep-
ing track of data controllers is burdensome or overwhelming,
or where selective trust is technically challenging (e.g. not
using technologies like MAC randomisation opens you up to
4We consciously omit discussion here about the legality of using fine-grained
data for price discrimination. Interested readers are pointed to [39].
tracking by non-trusted actors as well)—not to mention the dif-
ficulties of effective enforcement of a law which increasingly
concerns on all actions of all firms whose business models cen-
tre on natural persons.
It is clear that neither technique is a panacea for the social chal-
lenges ahead. In the next section, we highlight some of these
challenges in context with two cases: the first of a conceptual
store run by Amazon which uses tracking for service delivery
rather than as a marketing or analytical add-on, the second of
the challenges of enabling opt-ins or opt-outs in MAC address
tracking, which highlights a tension applicable to many PETs
today.
5 Challenging cases and promising directions
5.1 Tracking as a prerequisite to shopping: Amazon ‘Go’
Amazon.com, Inc.—the world’s largest e-retailer, one of the
world’s ten largest retailers of any type [11], and perhaps the
global authority on personalised purchasing—has expressed a
clear desire to move into physical retail both with its $14bn
purchase of premium supermarket chain Whole Foods Mar-
ket, Inc. and its hi-tech “Go” store concept. The latter gen-
erated much publicity as a shop that would sense, using a
range of technologies, what you take off the shelf, what you re-
turn, and automatically charge you as you leave without tills or
cashiers.5 It presented a vision where tracking was not just per-
vasive throughout a store, but necessary to its operation. While
a scaling-up of this concept may yet turn out to be vapourware,
a ‘beta’ version in Seattle, WA exists, accessible only to Ama-
zon employees.
Amazon’s own promotional material is low on technological
details, stating only that the “checkout-free shopping experi-
ence is made possible by [...] computer vision, sensor fu-
sion, and deep learning”. Yet we can undertaken some anal-
ysis of the types of technologies being considered given highly
specific Amazon patents published in recent years relating to
checkout-free shopping [27].
The patent, in addition to the few statements from the firm on
the topic [5], show that Amazon Go is powered not by a tag-
ging technology like RFID but by sensor fusion, profiling and
inference. A challenge however, and what appears to already
make the proposed technology sufficiently advanced to be ‘in-
distinguishable from magic’ [9], is its ability to detect a user’s
shopping choices without any explicit affirmative action (such
as barcode scanning) beyond what users in-store do already.
The patent provides context on how this is done, highlighting
that the technologies use a variety of inference-based systems
including a) the profiling of the skin colour of an user’s hand
in order to reidentify them across the store; b) triangulation of
5For an Amazon promotional video, see youtu.be/NrmMk1Myrxc
(Internet Archive version: archive.org/details/archiveteam_
videobot_twitter_com_805823848050528257). Note that
check-out free stores have been a business trope for some time: see a similar,
RFID–powered proposal from IBM in the mid 2000s [13].
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audio captured by ambient microphones in order to determine
the location of a user; c) triangulation of radio signals from a
user’s device; d) the use of the GPS chip on a user’s device; e)
the use of weight sensors and cameras designed to recognise
objects on shelves; and lastly f) estimating the most likely op-
tion based on “purchase history and/or what items the user has
already picked from other inventory locations” when analysis
from sensors remains uncertain. In addition, facial recognition
is suggested as an authentication modality upon entering the
store, albeit alongside generic ‘user provided information’.
In particular, many of the forms of data being processed about
individuals (who, by the nature of the system, are identifiable)
are what in the GDPR are called special categories of data.6
Of the above, not only are data concerning race (e.g. the skin
tone sensing) singled out, but as is all ‘biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person’—meaning
any of the sensors positioned around the store attempting to
identify an individual without using a device on their person
may qualify. Where a system decision is made using histori-
cal data about picked-up or purchased items, it is very possible
that health data is being latently processed—something that
was the case in the famous algorithmic ‘war story’ of Target,
whose loyalty card information was reportedly used to detect
pregnancy among its customers [14]. Furthermore, not only
can recorded audio data easily contain special category data
such as political opinions, it is also rarely considered propor-
tionate in a public space by regulators [24].
In the GDPR, all personal data processing requires a valid le-
gal ground. In the Amazon Go case, consent—only one legal
ground of many7—would not be easy to rely on. Firstly, any
consent must be freely given, specific, informed and unambigu-
ous. Given that any user in this store seemingly has no choice
(see below) but to be tracked, it is unlikely that this would be
freely given. The GDPR explicitly notes that consent is un-
likely to be considered as freely given when the “performance
of a contract, including provision of a service is conditional
on consent to the processing of personal data that is not neces-
sary for the performance of that contract” (art 7(4)). Ubiq-
uitous in-store surveillance—which in theory might quickly
scale to many stores, rather than specific ones we might think
of as novelties—does not seem “necessary” to the purchasing
of groceries, which would be the nature of the contract or ser-
vice in this situation.8 Because of this, data controllers would
generally rely on either “legitimate interest” or “for the per-
6In the GDPR, special category processing is the processing of “personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophi-
cal beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual ori-
entation” (art 9(1).
7Many, particularly in the media, misleadingly believe and incorrectly report
that the GDPR obliges data controllers obtain consent for data processing—
this is not true.
8While we do not expand upon it in this paper, we note that this hits against the
hotly contested legal area of “mall access litigation” which is increasingly a
symbolic test of the limits of private ownership and the potential for exclusion
in an increasingly “pseudo-public” patchwork of urban spaces [22, 28].
formance of a contract” grounds to justify processing. Yet in
this case, if the controller accepts special categories of data are
being processed, neither of these are options under the law.
As explicit consent is the legitimisation ground likely to be re-
quired in this case, it is key that when consenting, users can ef-
fectively refuse consent to the processing of at least the special
categories of data. Only then can the consent be considered
freely given, and those that wish to consent to such process-
ing can be considered to have done so in the eyes of the law.
But to have controller avoid capturing and processing special
categories of your data in a building filled with ambient sen-
sors is, of course, easier said than done. As discussed above,
unilateral methods to avoid tracking are, in general, practically
unworkable when biometric data is being captured in physical
environments. Some trust in the data controller to implement
privacy-preserving techniques during processing is likely nec-
essary. Yet with conventional methods, even to provide your
profile such that you can be robustly ‘ignored’ by the system
would require the processing of special categories of data. The
UK’s Data Protection Bill, under debate in Parliament at the
time of writing, has no derogations relating to the use of spe-
cial category data in order to opt-out from further collection,9
and indeed it is easy to see the wholesale collection of such
data being of concern to privacy activists even if not used for
other purposes, due to the need to keep it stored securely. In
this case, what is required is a mix between confidentiality and
control: the data controller must learn enough about you so that
they can exclude you from the system, but not enough so that
either the user is uncomfortable, or that they can be considered
to be processing special categories of data. For example, bio-
metric data might be subject to a hashing mechanism or similar
set-up to allow sensors to locally verify whether an individual
being sensed was on an opt-out list and avoid the recording
of data about them may serve such a purpose. Such technolo-
gies have been proposed in the context of face recognition [19],
yet the nature of sensor fusion makes this task challenging.
Indeed, there are legislative moves towards making ‘Do Not
Track’ signals legally binding,10 so working out how to send
these effectively and privately in physical, multi-modal envi-
ronments should be a technological priority for research in the
years to come.
5.2 Privacy by Default with Selective Consent
As outlined in Section 2.1.2, Wi-Fi probe packets are used to
monitor the movement of customers in indoor spaces. From a
technical perspective, this is achieved by capturing the probe
request frames sent by customers’ devices. These packets are
broadcast by smartphones, laptops (including many on standby
mode), and other devices that are not currently connected to
a Wi-Fi network. Every few seconds, the device broadcasts
multiple such packets, querying networks it has connected to
before. The packets have multiple fields which, among others,
specify the queried network’s name (i.e. SSID), the supported
9Such a derogation would be possible within the context of art 9(g), GDPR.
10See the discussion in [3] in relation to the draft ePrivacy Regulation.
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Fig. 2: Triangulation techniques are used by retailers to infer
the exact location of a mobile Wi-Fi–enabled device.
communication rates and the device’s factory-assigned, unique
identifier (i.e. MAC address). The probe loggers deployed
around the store capture these packets and match those origi-
nating from the same sender (i.e. same MAC address). While
no location information is embedded in the probing frames,
Wi-Fi transmissions have a well-defined range and the exact
location of the device can be inferred using triangulation (Fig-
ure 5.2).
To prevent this type of tracking, many major manufacturers
and operating systems (e.g. Android, iOS) have implemented
protocols to generate temporary, randomized MAC addresses
that differ from the factory-assigned one [29]. This mitigates
tracking, as the probe packets report the periodically-changed,
pseudonym addresses instead of the real one—although re-
searchers note that such mitigation is often only partial, and
significant re-identification can remain possible [36]. How-
ever, this partial technical solution had an unexpected side-
effect. It prevented tracking providers from allowing cus-
tomers to either opt-out or opt-in to tracking, and as a result
they lost the ability to either manage their own risk, or consent
to service provision which might have Wi-Fi triangulation as
a useful data collection modality. As the pseudonymous MAC
addresses are picked at random and are changed periodically,
the tracker does not know if an observed MAC address belongs
to a user that asked not to be tracked or not, meaning the the
blacklists regulators recommend [25] are ineffective almost in-
stantly after a user has committed to them.
We outline here an approach to be developed in further work
to illustrate the potential for trade-offs between personalisation
and privacy-by-default. We propose a hybrid randomisation
scheme which enables customers to selectively allow vendors
to track them, whilst they maintain the ability to unilaterally
opt-out at any time. From a technical perspective, we exploit
the fact that Wi-Fi–enabled devices broadcast probe frames for
each of the networks they have been connected to, in the recent
past. When a user opts-in to being tracked by a specific vendor,
then the vendor provides them with a “Vendor ID” and a unique
secret “Seed”. The user then sets up a new network connection
with the Vendor ID as the SSID. From now on, the device will
also broadcast probes for the vendor’s network, when seeking
for networks to connect to. The seed is used to enable track-
ing from that particular vendor. More specifically, instead of
generating new MAC addresses at random, a pseudorandom
number generator is used to generate new MACs based on the
secret seed, and the time and date (i.e., UNIX timestamp). This
enables a vendor who knows the seed for a particular customer
to link their pseudorandom MAC address back to them, while
the MAC will appear random to everyone else. As an alter-
native, the pseudorandom identifier can be stored in any other
field of the probe packet. To opt-out, the user simply removes
the network details from the device’s wireless networks list and
the device will stop broadcasting for that network. Such per-
missioning could be managed through user apps or through the
native provisions of operating systems designed to enable data
protection by design.
Overall, our randomisation scheme enables a more flexible ap-
proach to customer tracking as it enables the user to decide for
themselves, and gives them complete control over their data
and who they are sharing them with. It is a simple speci-
fication, but one whose logic could be applied more broadly
across different types of privacy enhancing technologies to en-
able more flexibility in the range of trade-offs deployed.
6 Concluding remarks
While the idea of personalisation in retail is not new, the vol-
ume of heterogeneous information sources needed to build ac-
curate customer profiles and make precise inferences hindered
its adoption until recently. This drastically changed with the
proliferation of IoT and other connected technologies that can
be used as tracking sensors for individuals. These advance-
ments enabled retailers to track and profile their customers
on an individual level, thus mimicking practices used by on-
line stores. Proportionate tracking for better service provision
to customers may not be a bad thing in and of itself, if cus-
tomers have reliable controls over the extent to which knowl-
edge about them is accessible and utilised, and technologies to
help this minimisation and purpose limitation are put in place.
Yet without safeguards, ubiquitous tracking in physical spaces
pose various severe challenges social challenges—particularly,
as we highlight, to privacy.
In this paper, we have argued that these challenges cannot be
realistically solved by either law or technology alone, which
tackle different parts of the problem, have their own relative
strengths, and without co-ordination can sit at tension. Techni-
cal approaches can assure desired outcomes in a limited set of
situations, and if implemented correctly can be powerful pri-
vacy tools. Yet there is only a limited amount that users can
unilaterally achieve, and many privacy preserving approaches
require the buy-in of data controllers too. These coopera-
tive efforts are not trusted by laypeople because they have e.g
checked the cryptography for mathematical soundness them-
selves, but because they trust social institutions which they
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deem credible and legitimate. Legal approaches allow for re-
dress and enforcement, and are potentially more accessible in
relation to physical trackers with a local legal presence com-
pared to faceless online data brokers, yet not only is the law
difficult to access for users, but regulators have traditionally
been underfunded and outgunned in relation to the scale of dig-
ital societal transformations. Both approaches are hard to im-
plement where individuals have incentives to hand away data
for economic purposes or for convenience. As the European
Data Protection Supervisor argued
There might well be a market for personal data, just
like there is, tragically, a market for live human or-
gans, but that does not mean that we can or should
give that market the blessing of legislation. One can-
not monetise and subject a fundamental right to a
simple commercial transaction, even if it is the indi-
vidual concerned by the data who is a party to the
transaction. [17]
We believe, in line with the trajectory of European data pro-
tection law, that individuals should not be pressured to hand
over personal data except for services for which those data
are strictly necessary to provide (e.g. personalisation autho-
rised by a user). Consequently, we propose a combination of
technical countermeasures and the utilisation of GDPR rights
and obligations that enables individuals to better exert control
over these technologies, including, if they want, to refuse to be
tracked entirely.
Biometric tracking presents a considerable challenge for this
area, and further research will be needed to work out how
consent can function with ambient sensors collecting sensitive
data—if it can function effectively at all. Indeed, as we note
with the Amazon Go concept store, some business models are
now predicated on collecting sensitive categories of data, such
as ethnicity, and using them as a necessary part of service de-
livery. This is difficult to reconcile with the law as is stands,
as we caution that such approaches which by their nature do
not allow opting out of tracking without opting out of ser-
vice use, could pressure individuals into sacrificing fundamen-
tal rights for economic reasons. Regulators and technologists
both need to consider how potentially ‘seamless’ technologies
can remain proportionate going forwards.
Privacy and data protection by design of all types is hugely im-
portant to ensure that infrastructures cannot be misused. Law
is only law if it can, in theory, be broken. Relying on trust
alone is problematic by nature in respect of this, as society of-
ten only grants license to install such systems on the basis that
their purpose is limited. But ignoring trust is equally prob-
lematic, and pretending what individuals and institutions be-
lieve is not important risks wide mistrust of a huge array of
technologies across the board regardless of application—trust
which can be difficult to recover. The act of personalising is
not inherently privacy-invading when done correctly, but if it is
undertaken poorly and recklessly, personalisation risks becom-
ing synonymous with exploitation. Balancing personalisation
and privacy requires giving individuals the practical ability to
determine how to be seen by trackers, the assurance that any
data provided for a personalisation service is proportionate and
necessary, as well as both control throughout the process and
technical assurances that such control is as sound as possible
give the state-of-the-art. This is daunting, but certainly within
the reach of resourceful researchers and practitioners, and we
should strive to achieve it.
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